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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to examine the role played by oversight boards in observing rule of law by Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Kenya. The objective of this study was to assess the extent to which rule 
of law as observed by NGO oversight Boards in Kenya influence accountability to stakeholders. A descriptive 
survey research design was used in this study and questionnaires were employed to collect quantitative data in an 
attempt to answer the research question. Test of hypothesis was done to establish if there was significant 
relationship between rule of law and accountability to stakeholders among the respondents. The ANOVA test of 
hypothesis revealed no significant relationship between accountability to stakeholders and rule of law (p<0.970). 
This shows that rule of law indicators like renewing NGO’s registration on time, did not have any significant 
influence on accountability to stakeholders. The results of a regression analysis done on the indicators of rule of 
law show a higher significance level (P<0.406). To a greater extent, most decisions made by oversight boards are 
communicated to the management team. In regard to involving boards in playing oversight role, fewer NGOs do 
not involve their boards in decision-making, P<0.833. This latter scenario represents disconnect between the 
management and the board; oversight is minimal and the board is largely asleep or absent, a characteristic of 
NGOs run by founder-directors and the board formed only to meet statutory requirements.  
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1  Introduction 
Oversight role is played by the board of a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) as a legal responsibility. 
Regardless of what board members are called, they are in essence the trustees in the literal and legal sense of the 
term (National Center for Nonprofit Board ,2012: 5) and; “The first obligation of any board of trustees is to 
know the law and establish compliance with it” (Letts, 2005:3). 
Tandon (2006) identifies four different types of NGOs’ governing boards as: Family boards, consisting 
of people sharing kinship; Invisible boards - comprising a small coterie of friends and family assembled by the 
founder(s) merely for the purposes of meeting statutory requirements on paper; Staff boards, that largely consists 
of current staff of an NGO; and Professional boards where the composition and functioning of the board is more 
formal. In the latter, the board evaluates or audits the performance of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), senior 
staff and the NGO in a regular and formal manner, it offers on-going professional guidance to the NGO and 
shapes its policies and strategies, and in situations of crisis, the board is able to undertake true function of 
governance. 
Insofar as an NGO works within a sovereign state, the most important measure by which an NGO is 
judged is its adherence to legal requirements. The board must know what laws apply and whether operations are 
in compliance. If legal obligations are not being met, the board must ensure that necessary corrections are made. 
Even though specific responsibilities can be delegated to the chief executive, in nearly all countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe, it is the board that vouches for the legal compliance of the NGO (Wyatt, 2004: 40). 
Rule of law, observance of which boards are obliged to uphold as a legal duty, is a terminology open to 
multiple interpretations and usage. According to Stephenson (2008) a survey of its use in Germany, France and 
the United Kingdom concludes that the term has no one specific meaning. It "belongs to the category of open-
ended concepts which are subject to permanent debate" Grote 1999: 271 in (Stephenson, 2008). This study, 
nevertheless, adopts the usage according to Vernon (2009) that, rule of law is adherence to and enforcement of 
transparent laws, policies, regulations and codes of conduct.  
In the Republic of Kenya, the government put in place a regulatory organ called the Non-Governmental 
Organizations Coordinating Board. This board receives applications for NGO registration. While applying for 
registration, the applicants are required to submit a copy of their constitution with some compulsory clauses on 
governance structure, stating the board members, the management team, management of the NGO funds, and a 
clause on dissolution. In the latter clause the applicants must state that the assets of the NGO will be transferred 
to an organization with similar objectives upon dissolution (Gok, 2006). 
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1.1 Objective of the Study 
To assess the extent to which rule of law as observed by NGO oversight Boards in Kenya influence 
accountability to stakeholders  
 
1.2 Research Question 
To what extent does rule of law as observed by NGO oversight Boards in Kenya influence accountability to 
stakeholders?  
 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
In order to further understand the research question above, the following hypothesis was developed. 
Ha: There is a significant relationship between rule of law as observed by NGO oversight Boards in Kenya and 
accountability to stakeholders.  
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
It was hoped that the findings of this study would provide insights for a myriad of government ministries and aid 
agencies to develop policies and strategies that would inform their approaches to programmes and projects 
planning and implementation.  
 It was hoped that knowledge generated from this study would serve as a beneficial reference material to 
policy makers at the Kenyan NGO Coordination Board, students, both directors and programme managers in 
various NGOs, general readers and researchers in the field of NGO management and all individuals and 
organizations keen on upholding accountability in their programmes and projects. 
 
1.5 Basic Assumptions of the Study 
This study was anchored on the basic assumption that rule of law as observed by NGO oversight boards has 
influence on their accountability to stakeholders. The study assumed that the respondents to the questionnaires 
would be available, appreciated the purpose of the study, understood the questions posed, and gave candid 
responses. It is also assumed that the researcher took precaution to develop a well structured research instrument 
that was administered in a manner that minimised any bias. 
 
1.6 Limitation of the Study 
Some of the NGOs changed their physical addresses without notice and this made accessibility to their personnel 
and premises challenging; the people in management positions in the NGOs were often on the run - with very 
limited time to attend to issues that were not directly related to their immediate programme or project goals and 
objectives. To overcome the limitation of time and ensure a high response rate among the respondents, the 
research instruments were collected from the respondents as soon as they finished answering the questions. 
Where respondents needed more time, an arrangement was made to pick the questionnaires before the end of the 
day. The researcher also made follow up through telephone calls to the respondents requesting them to avail 
dully filled questionnaire at an agreed time, by leaving it with the organization’s secretary or receptionist if the 
respondent would not be available in person. This ensured that at least one NGO staff was found in the 
organization to return the questionnaire. 
 
1.7 Delimitation of the Study 
This research was delimited to NGOs registered in Kenya, headquartered in the Municipality of Kisumu and 
working along the Lake Victoria Basin. Kisumu Municipality has a large number of these NGOs serving the 
communities along Kenya’s Lake Victoria Basin. According to a survey done by NGOs Coordination Board in 
Kenya, the former Nyanza Province – now consisting of Kisumu, Siaya, Homa-Bay, Nyamira, Kisii and Migori 
Counties – is only second to Nairobi in terms of distribution of NGOs (NGOs Coordination Board, 2009: 28); 
and Kisumu Municipality as the de facto capital of the former Nyanza Province in Kenya, boasts of a larger 
concentration of NGOs than other parts of the greater western region, and based on this fact the study was 
delimited to Kisumu Municipality.  
  
1.8 Conceptual Framework 
This study was guided by the following conceptual framework, as perceived by the researcher, and shown in 
Figure 1.  Rule of law that gives legal framework to NGO operation can be enacted and this would have a 
bearing on the level of accountability or lack of it to stakeholders. Boards ought to provide oversight and also 
understand what the law requires and establish mechanisms for compliance; this can be done by ensuring legal 
documents like registration certificates are renewed on time. Boards that neither have clear set of rules for its 
operation nor meet regularly to review running of projects creates accountability gap. 
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2 Literature Review 
Governments may wish to enforce registration  and monitoring mechanisms in order to keep track of NGO 
activities to avoid duplication and establishment of false organizations and to ensure quality and accountability 
according to Gilson et al., 1994; Green and Matthias, 1997 (in Mayhew, 2005). Governments may also desire to 
regulate, or even restrict, NGOs when they feel that NGOs siphon off resources which might otherwise have 
come to the state or where they are afraid that NGO activities could challenge state ideology, as explained by  
Hulme and Edwards 1997 (in Mayhew, 2005). NGOs on the other hand, may consequently be weary of state 
intervention for fear that their freedoms and independence will be undermined, although they may also 
acknowledge benefits in legislation to protect their activities and maintain their reputation (Mayhew, 2005).  
The governments confer legal identity to NGOs and define the extent to which they can act legitimately 
and independently from the government. The outcome of legislation and regulation might be two-fold. First, it 
may create a free environment for NGO operations and make them subject to checks and balances as is the case 
in the Philippines, Bangladesh and Kenya (Slim, 2002; Kim, 2003; Songco, 2010; Kameri-Mbote, 2002). Second, 
legislation can be a conduit for curtailing freedoms of NGOs and make non-government activities difficult, for 
instance through uncalled for bureaucracy, high fees, and restrictions on receipt of aid. NGOs whose sources of 
funding have been extremely scrutinized, controlled and even taxes imposed on donor-funds include: Russia, 
Moldova, Venezuela, Uzbekistan, Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe (Vernon, 2009). 
Virtually all European countries require that NGOs be registered to acquire legal personality in order to 
protect NGO’s capital from founders or donors or creditors. In addition, any legal person may be required to 
present its basic data and annual accounts in a public register, besides submitting their annual accounts with a 
competent authority as a compulsory regulatory provision, as a means to ensure that credible information is 
provided to all parties with whom the organization enters into contracts (European Foundation Centre, 2011). 
In both Taiwan and the Philippines, the government does not have a firm grip on regulating NGOs. The 
government maintains a soft stand on NGO regulation and sees the latter as an ‘independent sector,’ therefore, 
the government only facilitates their activities while slightly regulating them. In the Philippines, Government 
Department of Finance worked with NGO leaders to establish a self-regulatory mechanism and eventually put an 
NGO umbrella agency in charge of NGO certification process. The result was the creation of the Philippines 
Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) in 1997 when some of the largest NGO networks joined forces to set up 
good governance models for NGOs. Perhaps the only NGO that is based in a single developing country and 
focuses on accreditation of other NGOs is the PCNC of the Philippines. Grounded firmly on mechanisms of 
functional accountability and given teeth by the Philippine government’s mandate that NGOs be accredited, 
PCNC has logged and certified 1,000 of that country’s NGOs. They have also reportedly brought the estimated 
number of organizations acting as NGOs in the Philippines down to 6,000 - from estimates of 60,000 and even 
249,000 to 497,000 (Kim 2003; Songco 2010). 
For both the developing world and the economies in transition, the Philippines takes the enviable 
position of a trail-blazer, a pace-setter as well as a benchmark for NGO registration and regulatory framework. 
The aforementioned country has a reputation for being the first in Asia and among the first in the world to 
establish a regulatory body named the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) as confirmed by (Kim 
2003; Slim 2002; Songco 2010; Mayhew 2005; Antlöv, Ibrahim and van Tuijl, 2005). 
Barr, Fafchamps and Owens, (2004) observe that in the UK, for instance, NGOs are registered with and 
report to the Charities Commission. The rationale for regulation is that, by diverting funds, unscrupulous 
individuals may undermine the public trust in NGOs and hence reduce funding to the NGO sector as a whole. 
(Kim, 2003) has noted that in Australia, in 1989, the National Security Council stated the need for accountability 
and the Royal Charter required organizations to register in order to be eligible to receive state funding. There is 
also the Corporate Act under which NGOs can be incorporated under the same regulation as business 
corporations. In addition, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) has developed codes of conduct for 
their members and subsequently other development NGOs have attempted to follow suit. 
On the other hand, Vietnam’s strong socialist government defends its supremacy through a 
sophisticated framework of substantial structure and breadth – the government seeks to control rather than 
regulate and enable the NGO sector which remains weak. At the other extreme, Cambodia has weak government 
capacity with no formal policies toward the NGO sector, which is therefore dissipated and uncoordinated 
(Mayhew, 2005), while in Peru, there is no legislation obliging Civil Society Organization to be accountable 
(Cano, 2010). 
Within the set-up of the Nepali government, it is the role of the Social Welfare Council to monitor the 
non-governmental organisations. In the Social Welfare Act of 1992, specific provisions are made that require 
INGOs to work in partnership with Nepali Organisation prohibiting them from direct implementation of 
programmes and projects in Nepal (Singh and Ingdal, 2007).  
In Kenya, the NGOs are bound by law to submit annual financial reports to the Coordination Board and 
disclose sources of funding (Gok, 2006) and a registered NGO which fails to submit its annual returns within the 
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prescribed period shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five thousand Kenya Shillings (NGO Coordination Board, 
2008).    
In most Indonesian NGOs, the governing board or founders of individual NGOs dominate leadership, 
allowing for little to no input from staff (Kim, 2003). A large number of NGOs in Nepal are founded by 
individuals who feel it is their right to be both in the management and the board, therefore, the board’s role in 
terms of checks and balances and ensuring internal control mechanisms are less emphasized by Nepali NGOs 
(Singh and Ingdal, 2007); while in many South Asian NGOs the board is ‘sleeping’ or invisible, and governance 
functions cannot be performed properly. A key issue in the arena of governance arises in situations where the 
founder is the leader of the NGO for a substantial period of time and most board members are individually 
known to and associated with the founder-leader. This has the potential to limit the autonomous identity of the 
board (Tandon, 2006); yet exemplary boards institutionalize a culture of inquiry, mutual respect, and 
constructive debate that leads to sound and shared decision-making; they are independent-minded, and as such, 
do not allow their votes to be unduly influenced by loyalty to the CEO (Lassner, 2006). 
Kim (2003) also postulates that Australian NGOs rely largely on the board of directors of NGOs to 
provide governance and transparency in terms of fiduciary accountability and efficiency.  
Among responsibilities conferred on Non-profit boards in the USA are: assuring compliance with local, 
state and federal laws and regulations; questioning unreasonable governmental intrusion; adhering to the highest 
ethical and moral standards of organization behaviour (National Center for Nonprofit Boards, 2012: 8). 
In South Africa a number of laws govern Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), for example, Section 30 
of the Income Tax Act imposes other conditions on the governance and operations of Public Benefit 
Organizations (PBO). For instance, the organization‘s constitution must provide that there are at least three 
unrelated persons with fiduciary responsibility for the organization and no single person directly or indirectly 
controls the decision making powers relating to the organization (Jillo and  Kisinga, 2009:50). 
NGO Coordination Board (2008) asserts that, in Kenya, all organizations registered under the NGOs 
Coordination Act, 1990 are expected to establish a substantive Board within one year after registration; separate 
their governance and management functions; clearly state the intervals at which they shall hold General 
Meetings; inform the NGOs Coordination Board within fourteen working days of any changes in the Board of 
the organization; seek approval from the NGOs Co-ordination Board before they make changes to the NGO’s 
constitution.  
In Rwanda, every NPO submits a detailed report on its achievements, balance sheet and financial 
situation by April 30 of every year. All local NPOs submit their reports to the Ministry of Local Government, 
while International NPOs submit their reports to the Ministry of International Affairs. Non submission of annual 
reports may lead to a suspension of the organization‘s (Jillo and Kisinga, 2009:50). Nevertheless, in Uganda, 
little monitoring is done by government as NGOs do not file income tax returns and few are able to provide 
coherent financial accounts (Barr, Fafchamps and Owens, 2004).  
Within three months after the end of their financial year, it is a requirement that all registered NGOs in 
Kenya submit an annual report in compliance with the NGOs regulation 1992 (section 24). The Annual Report 
should have an audited account stating all income and expenditure for receipts and expenditure exceeding one 
million Kenya Shillings; contact address of the NGO and the incumbent contact person as well as information on 
Board meetings and Annual General Meetings (NGOs Coordination Board, 2008). 
 
3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Research Design  
This study employed descriptive survey research design. This design that involves quantitative approaches is 
economical as well as efficient, and therefore appropriate for this study. This design had been chosen bearing in 
mind the often tight schedules under which the respondents from whom data were to be gathered operate. It was 
suitable for this study taking into consideration time constraints anticipated during the research. Descriptive 
survey design enabled the researcher to describe the population with respect to a given outcome and to collect 
information on many variables from a large number of respondents and hence it was an efficient way of 
collecting information for this particular study since it involved a large population. Kothari (2008) notes that it is 
considered a good design for research whose purpose is accurate description of a situation or of an association 
between variables.  
 
3.2 Target Population 
Target population is “that population to which a researcher wants to generalize the results of the study” 
(Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003); it means the entire set about which the researcher wishes to make 
generalizations; it may be people, objects or institutions (Spasford, 2007). In this study, the target population 
comprised 96 respondents from 96 NGOs in Kisumu Municipality; from each NGO there was one respondent, a 
project manager or an equivalent of a project manager.  
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.41, 2015 
 
138 
3.3  Sample Size 
Sample size was determined by using Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) table. The table suggested that, if the 
population reaches 100, the sample size must be 80. There is an interval of 10 for population sizes N falling 
between 100 and 300. Since the population of this study is 96, which is in-between 90 and 100, the best sample 
to use was arrived at by choosing population size N of 100 whose sample size S is 80. 
 
4   Results and Discussions 
In order to establish the level of adhere to rule of law in the organizations under study, the respondents were 
asked whether: the organizations renewed their legal documents on time; the organization involved its board in 
decision-making; board decisions are shared with management team; the board uses a clear set of rules for its 
own operation and; whether the board members have regular meetings to review the running of the projects.  The 
findings are addressed in the subsequent tables and discussions. 
 
4.1 The organization’s renewal of legal documents before expiry 
The study sought to find out the respondents’ view about the validity of organizations’ legal documents through 
timeliness of their renewal. When participants were asked to respond to the statement that; “The organization 
renews its legal documents on time before expiry.” Table 1 shows that out of 76 respondents, 49 (64.5%) and 26 
(34.2%) strongly agreed and agreed respectively; but 1 (1.3%) disagreed. From these findings, it is clear that rule 
of law, in terms of adhering to registration standards, are observed by majority of the NGOs in Kisumu 
Municipality. These results therefore indicate that the NGOs are accountable to the regulating authority through 
prompt renewal of legal documents like certificate of registration. A study in China on achievements and 
dilemmas of NGOs’ governance by Xiaoguang and Li (2010) shows that NGOs in China neither have legal 
person status nor the status of a legal social organization and sometimes they engage in for-profit activities 
without paying taxes according to the law. 
 
4.2 The Board’s involvement in decision-making  
The study sought to find out the respondents’ view on whether the organization involves its board in decision-
making. The responses were as indicated in Table 2.  From the table, majority of the respondents either strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement that the organization involves its board in decision-making.  Among the 76 
participants, 57 (75.0%) of the respondents strongly agreed and 17 (22.4%) agreed with the statement, compared 
to 1 (1.3%) who disagreed and another 1 (1.3%) who strongly disagreed that their organization involves its board 
in decision-making. From the results, it can be interpreted that over 90% of the respondents affirm that their 
boards take part in making decisions in the organization.  
 
4.3 Board decision shared with management team  
The study also sought to establish the extent to which board decisions are communicated to the management 
team. In responding to the question on whether the decision of the board is shared with the management team, 
majority of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement as shown in Table 3. From the study findings, 47 
(61.8%) respondents strongly agreed with this statement; 27 (35.5%) agree and 2 (2.6%) disagree. In general, the 
study established that majority of the project managers strongly agreed that decisions of their board of directors 
are communicated to the management team. This suggests that in their mandate of providing oversight and 
guidance to the NGOs, most boards give feedback on the deliberations that take place in the boardrooms. This 
way, upward accountability to this group of stakeholders is assured, because when the management team 
receives communication from the board the former would be keen on implementing the decisions of the latter.  
The findings of this study are in agreement with the tenets of the stakeholder theory. This theory 
suggests that managers must formulate and implement processes which satisfy all who have a stake in the 
business by integrating the relationships and interests of shareholders, employees and other groups in a way that 
guarantees the long-term success of the firm (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). This mandate of the management 
team of formulating and implementing activities, projects and programmes is made possible when a strong 
communication and feedback link is maintained between the highest decision-making organ of the organization 
(the board) and the managers.  
 
4.4 Clear rules used by the board for its operation 
The study sought to establish whether the board has put in place clear set of rules for its own operation. The 
results are as indicated in Table 4. The study reported findings regarding a set of rules used by the board for its 
own operation, 48 (63.2%) respondents strongly agreed, 27 (35.5%) agreed; while 1 (21.3%) disagreed with the 
statement that the board uses a clear set of rules for its own operation. From these findings, it emerged that 
governing boards within most NGOs have established a clear set of rules for the boards’ own operations. 
A study in Nepal on donors’ best practices towards NGOs by Singh and Ingdal (2007) showed that 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.41, 2015 
 
139 
some of the registered NGOs have (or at least claim to have) governing rules and policies as required by the 
country’s Social Welfare Council. However, just like in Kenya, most NGOs in Nepal are founded by groups of 
close network of friends and relatives and therefore the compliance with the governing rules and policies and the 
fairness of the internal governing systems can be questioned.  
 
4.5 Board regular meetings to review running of projects 
The NGO law in Kenya demands that NGO boards have regular meetings to assess and guide the management in 
reviewing progress in realizing organizational strategic plans and projects. In their constitutions filed by the 
NGO Coordination Board, the NGOs should clearly stipulate the number of times its own governing board 
would meet for the purposes of providing oversight. This study therefore sought to establish whether the 
governing boards within various NGOs comply with this regulatory requirement by holding regular meetings to 
review running of its projects. From the results shown in Table 5, 51 (67.1%) strongly agreed and 24 (31.6%) 
agreed that their boards conduct regular meetings to review the running of the projects. Out of the 76 
respondents only 1 (1.3%) disagreed with the statement. Majority of the board of governors within the NGOs 
from which respondents were drawn indeed comply with the regulatory requirement of holding regular meetings. 
A board that upholds the law by having consistent meetings is considered to be accountable to its regulatory 
organ (upward accountability) and its management and beneficiary community (downward accountability).  
 
4.6  Results of test of hypothesis  
The study also sought to test hypothesis to establish if there were significant relationship between rule of law and 
accountability to stakeholders among the respondents as shown in Table 6. On the significance column the 
ANOVA results show a statistical significance p= .970 while the p value was set to be significant at p< 0.05 level. 
The ANOVA test of hypothesis revealed no significant relationship between accountability to stakeholders and 
rule of law (p<0.970). We then fail to reject the null hypothesis at p<0.05. This shows that rule of law indicators 
like renewing NGO’s registration on time, did not have any significant influence on accountability to 
stakeholders.  
 
4.7 Regression analysis on rule of law 
This study gives an output of regression analysis on rule of law in table 7 to establish its influence on 
accountability to stakeholders. The analysis was done on a set of indicators namely; timely renewal of legal 
documents; involving oversight board in decision-making; sharing the boards decisions with the management 
team; the board’s use of a clear set of rules for its own operation; and the board having regular meetings to 
review the running of projects and/or programmes The results of a regression analysis done on the indicators of 
rule of law like involving oversight board in decision-making show a higher significance level (P<0.406). To a 
greater extent, most decisions made by oversight boards are communicated to the management team. In regard to 
involving boards in playing oversight role, fewer NGOs do not involve their boards in decision-making, P<0.833. 
This latter scenario represents disconnect between the management and the board; oversight is minimal and the 
board is largely asleep or absent, a characteristic of NGOs run by founder-directors and the board formed only to 
meet statutory requirements.  
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Table 1 Organization’s legal documents 
 
Table 2 Board’s involvement in decision-making 
 
 
Statement The organization renews its legal documents on time before 
expiry 
   Freq                   % 
 Strongly Agree 
Agree  
Disagree   
Strongly Disagree  
   49 
   26 
    1 
    0  
 64.5 
 34.2 
   1.3 
   0.0 
Total     76 100.0 
Statement  The organization involves its board in decision-making 
         Freq                   % 
 Strongly Agree 
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly Disagree 
   57 
   17 
    1 
     1 
 75.0 
 22.4 
   1.3 
   1.3 
Total     76 100.0 
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Table 3 Board decision shared with management team 
 
Table 4 Board operating on a clear set of rules 
 
Table 5 Board meetings for review of projects 
 
Table 6 ANOVA output of test of hypothesis two  
Model  
Sum of 
squares         df 
Mean 
square  
 
F   Sig. 
  1      Regression       .159     5   .032      .179      .970a 
          Residual   12.472   70 .178   
          Total   12.632   75    
  
 
Statement  Board decisions are shared with management team 
         Freq                   % 
 Strongly Agree 
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly Disagree 
    47  
    27 
      2 
      0 
 61.8 
 35.5 
   2.6 
   0.0 
Total     76 100.0 
Statement The board uses a clear set of rules for its own operation 
       Freq                   % 
 Strongly Agree 
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly Disagree 
    48 
    27 
      1 
      0 
 63.2 
 35.5 
   1.3 
   0.0 
Total     76 100.0 
Statement The board members have regular meetings to review the running 
of projects/programmes 
       Freq                   % 
 Strongly Agree 
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly Disagree 
51 
24 
1 
0 
 67.1 
 31.6 
   1.3 
   0.0 
Total 76 100.0 
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Table 7 Predictors of rule of law coefficients 
 Model 
      
      B     SE        Beta(β)    t       Sig. 
1(Constant) 
 
The organization renews its legal 
documents on time before expiry 
 
The organization involves its board in 
decision-making. 
 
Board decisions are shared with 
management team 
 
The board uses a clear set of rules for its 
own operation 
 
The board members do have regular 
meetings to review the running of the 
project/program 
 
1.264 
   
  .035 
 
 
 -.022 
 
 
  -.092 
 
 
   .058 
 
 
  -.018 
 
  
  .202 
               
.106 
 
 
.101            
 
 
 .110 
 
 .119 
           
 
.107 
           
           6.261    .000 
  . 
    043    .328     .744   
 
 
   -.029    -.212    .833 
  
 
   -.122    -.835    .406 
 
 
 .073    .488    .627 
 
         
  -.022   -.169    .866 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Means Accountability  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework showing Independent Variable and Dependent Variable 
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